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Black Hawk and his redskin band,
Was a terror in the land ,
Proud he was the Indian chief,
Who could live on Mormon beef.
F. Christensen

PREFACE

From 1865 until 1871 the Territory of Utah was the scene of a littleknown war.

The Ute and Piute Indians responding to pressure of white

settlers devastated much of Utah south of Spanish Fork. During the first
three years of warfare the Mormon Settlements south of the Utah Valley
struggled to exist.

The next three years saw improving conditions but a

continuation of raids by the Navaho in the south.
This was a private war.

Attempts to get government aid were futile.

The settlers and the Mormon Church provided the men and equipment necessary.
While the problems faced by the settlers were similar to those of all frontier
areas they were compounded by remoteness and lack of preparation.
Because of the oft repeated phrase attributed to Brigham Young, "It is
cheaper to feed them than to fight them," little attention is given to the Indian
problems.

Indian troubles are lightly covered or ignored in the general belief

that the Mormon settlers were able to develop cities and towns without Indian
problems. Yet, in 1866 some 2, 500 men were under arms attempting to secure
the Mormon frontier.
It is hoped that this paper will hlep in completing the picture of this

phase of Utah history.

To those who guided and aided in the preparation I

would like to express thanks and appreciation.
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CHAPTER I

MORMON-INDIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1865

When the Mormons settled in the Salt Lake Valley they found that it
was considered a no-man's land.

The valley was an uninhabited area between

lands occupied by the Shoshone Indians to the North and the Ute Indians to the
South.
The Ute Indians constituted one of the poorest tribes of Indians in
America.

The land they occupied was one of rugged mountains with short swift

streams leading into arid deserts.

The Ute struggled to survive in a land where

even today man with his technical and scientific know-how often finds the winters
severe.

The Ute depended on all animals for food and gathered berries, grapes,

roots, pinion nuts and fish.

1

In some areas he also harvested wild grass seed

in the fall to supplement his diet.
With the Mormon philosophy that each individual was to do all he could
for himself as well as participate in the cooperative ventures of the community,
an attempt was made to provide every man his own land.

With thousands of

families coming into the region every year it was necessary that new areas be
explored for settlement.

1

Exploration teams were sent in all directions from

s. Lymon Tyler, "Before Escalante: An Early History of the Yuta
Indians" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of History, University
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1951), p. 34.

2

Salt Lake City seeking sites that were suitable for settlement.

With the

Mormon leadership interested in settling the good lands in the territory and
with several good valleys within a short distance of Salt Lake City , it was not
many years until settlements were established in them .
The valleys suitable for settlement were also the homelands of the Ute
Indians . With the Ute already having subsistance problems it was inevitable
that the incuration of the Mormons would result in more problems.
The Mormon policy proved to be not much different from that of the United
States.

In 1849 the first group of settlers to move into utah Valley south of Salt

Lake City were stopped by a band of Timpanogoes Ute who showed concern about
the large number of white settlers.

The settlers were required to enter into a

treaty that they would not drive the Indians from their lands nor deprive them of
their rights.

Dimick B. Huntington, the Indian interpreter, was required to seal

the treaty by raising his right hand and swearing by the sun.

Yet, the gradual

increase of settlers had forced the Indians from the valley by 1865, except for a
few who lived on the reservation farm at Spanish Fork.

2

Brigham Young, while advising that every effort should be made to
cultivate the friendship of the Indians, believed that the whites should definitely
remain above them.

His philosophy, as expressed is 1849, was "If you consider

them your equals you cannot raise them up to you. "
2
3

3

In giving instructions to

"History of Provo," Tullidge's Quarterly Magazine (July, 1884), 23.

History of Brigham Young, Ms. , May, 1849, pp. 76-77, quoted in
B. H. Roberts, A Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints (6 Vols., Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret News Press, 1930),
Vol. Ill, p. 458.

3

the colonists at Fort Utah on Octobe r 18, 1849 , he said:
Tend to your own affairs , and let the Indi ans take care of
themselves. Let your women and children stay in the fort, and
the Indians stay out; but, while you mix with them promiscuously,
you must continue to receive such treatment from them which they
please to give . . . be familiar with the Indians and they will be
more familiar; and the more familiar, you will find the less influence you will have with them. If you would have dominion over
4
them, for their good .
you must not treat them as your equals .
Young had no illusions ahout the Indians.

He knew it would take years

to teach them the ways of the white people. He also knew that if the two peoples
were to exist side by side relations had to be good between them.
Mormons to do what they could to feed and clothe the Indians.

He urged the

He e xpressed the

feeling that more lives would be saved by feeding and clothing the Indians tha n
through military pressure.

5

Travelers in the territory during the late 1870's

a nd early 1880's expressed the feeling that they traveled in safety be c ause of
the good relationships betwee n the two peoples.

One traveler said, "The

Mormon policy became, it is cheaper to feed them than to fight them . "

6

Young

wanted the Indians kept in their place , a nd felt that trouble could be avoided if
caution were used.

4

Ibid . , p. 458.

5
Journal of Discourses, Vol. X, p. 108.
6
Phil Robinson, Saints and Sinners (Boston, Massachusetts: Roberts
Brothers Press, 1883) , p. 126. This was expressed by Robinson after he
trave led the Utah Territory as being the policy of the settlers .

4

Relations between whites and Ute were often strained.

The white men

had driven many Indian groups to new fishing locations by the darning and
diverting of streams.

The white man had fenced meadows and plowed the

fertile areas that provided much of the berry and root food supply of the Indians.
The white man also introduced cattle and sheep into the area.

They spread over

the unfenced areas eating the grass and driving the wild animals higher into the
mountains.
of seed.

The sheep and cattle ate the grass that provided the winter supply

Food was usually scarce for the Indian and he found it becoming more

scarce as the increasing number of settlers spread, and fe nced the new land.
The white man's cattle, horses and sheep looked like a better way of life for
the destitute Indian.

As early as 1850 an Indi an agent accused the Mormons of

causing the problems by taking the best lands .
The white man , not knowing, or caring, was doing the same thing that
other Indi an tribes had faced everywhere white men settled.

Indian removal

was not a stated policy until the elimination of the Indian farms at Spanish Fork
and Twelve Mile Creek in the 1860's. Nevertheless, the practice of pushing
the Indians into the remote areas was a de facto removal policy.

The white

settlers saw good land going to waste and were determined to utilize it.

The

Indian Agency in the Utah Territory appeared to be concerned only with keeping the Indians pacified.
The ute, finding that the semi-domesticated cattle and sheep were
easier to kill than wild animals, often killed for food.

Within the white man's

concept of "thou shalt not steal" this became a crime that had to be punished .

5

Many white settlers were nearly destitute themselves and could not afford
the loss of livestock.
either.

Both sides had problems and nothing was done to help

Most Indian troubles in Utah resulted from livestock theft .
Military force was used several times against the Indians before 1865.

The only prolonged difficulties however, were those in connection with the
Walker War, 1853-54.

7

One attempt to upgrade the Indian was that of the Indian farm .

Follow-

ing the council of Governor Young, five small reservations were established
in the counties of Utah, Juab, Sanpete, Millard, and Iron.

8

These reservations

became known as Indian farms because some attempts were made to teach the
Indians farming and ways of a sedentary life.
With the arrival of Johnston's army in 1858 the farms were neglected
and allowed to deteriorate.

As settlers increased in the Sanpete and Utah

County area, pressure was applied to the Indian Agency to close the Spanish
Fork and Twelve Mile Creek areas and turn them over to settlers. In May,
1860, the Federal Government appropriated $53, 000 to pay for past Indian

agents and costs of surveying and mapping the farms.

9

The farms existed

until a treaty between the Indians and Government was negotiated in June,

7
Gustive 0. Larson, Outline History of Utah and the Mormons
(Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Company, 1958), p. 149.
8
Names of these farms were: Spanish Fork, Utah Co.; Corn Creek,
Millard Co. ; Twelve Mile Creek, Sanpete Co. ; Deep Creek, Tooele Co. ;
Pinto, Iron Co.
9

Gustive 0. Larson, p. 152.

1865, when the Ute gave up the two farms for the Uintah Reservation.

Ute-Indian Relations

While Indian problems continued to increase within the Mormon settlements, events were shaping on the Western plains that may have contributed to
further difficulty.

The start of the Civil War drew from the plains the best of

the military units.

Indian problems were largely ignored during the war, but

efforts were made shortly after its conclusion to solve them.

The Ute who

ranged over Colorado and Eastern Utah had communication with the Plains
Indians.

10

Military actions against the Plains Indians and the losses suffered

by the Indians may have added to the belligerence of Black Hawk and other
braves who were not happy with the concilitory policies of their leaders. Surely
the Ute and Navaho knew of the Sand Creek Massacre.
One of the major problems with the Indians during this period was the
indecisiveness of the U.S. Government concerning Indians . Control over the
Indians was shifted from one governmental department to the other.

Frontier

officers often never knew what the policy toward the Indians would be . The
Government defaulted on several treaties.
ments live up to.
ington are liars. "

Payments were not made or agree-

Chief Spotted Tail of the Sioux said, "All men from Wash11

10
Rex Curry, Administrative Officer, Ute Indian Tribe, Fort
Duchesne , Utah, "Background History of the Ute Tribe," Manuscript in this
writer's possession. n. d. (Typewritten)
11
Fairfax Downey, Indian Fighting Army (New York: Bantam Books,
1957), p. 37.

Perhaps during the 1860's the greatest Indian leaders of the plains
developed.

The plains saw Indi ans win major victories.

The defeat of

Captain W. B. Fette rman and his company by Crazy Horse on December 21,
1866, could have furnished example to al l Indians and increased the hos tility
of the Ute.
With the Indian troubles on the plains it is understandable that the
Utah settlers could not get federal aid when they asked for it.
States was sti ll suffering from the effects of the Civil War.
and people in the East had their own problems.

The United

Debts were high

People who lived in the remote

mountains of the West were l argely forgotten by the states.
Relations between the Ute and other Indians were good enough that
when the Ute began to raid the Mormon settlements, Navaho braves soon came
to get in on the spoils.

12

The Navaho also began to raid settlements in

Southern Utah during this period.

There are accounts of some Piede and

Pavan Indians aiding the Navaho in the Southern part of the territory.

Most

of the Piede and Pavan Indi ans, however, remained neutral or aided the
settlers.

There are no accounts of other Indians becoming involved in the war.

Events Leading to War

In 1849 Chief Walker of the Ute tribe visited Brigham Young in Salt
12
F. H. Head, Indian Commissioner, Utah Territory, Letter to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, April 30, 1866. Indian Affairs Reports 1865-71
(Microfilm copy at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah).

8

Lake City.

During thi s visit he asked that settlers be sent to the Sanpete

region to establish farms and show the Indians how to become farmers . The
first settlers were called to this region in the fall of 1849.

13

Relations between whites and Indians in the Sanpete region had been
good from the year 1849 to the winter of 1864-65.
livestock but no serious problems had erupted.

There had been thefts of

The Mormons made periodic

gifts of flour and livestock but no serious attempts were made to civilize the
Indians.
The winter of 1864-65 was a bad one for the band of Ute Indians camped
near Gunnison on the Sevier River.

The winter was severe and food was scarce.

Indians of the band killed some of the settler's livestock for food.

During the

winter an epidemic of smallpox or measles swept Indian camps killing many.

14

Some of the spiritual le aders of th e Indians began to blame the Mormons for the
disease.

15

With the blame placed on the Mormons for their problems the

Indians began to boast about what they planned to do to the Mormons when spring
came.

Mormon leaders , unfortunately, shrugged off such warnings as being

incidental.

16

13
14

Roberts, Comprehensive History of the Church, III, p. 461.
Both diseases are found in sources; evidence is about equal for

both.
15
Peter Gottfredson, History of Indian Depredations in Utah (Salt
Lake City, Utah: Skelton Publishing Co., 1909), pp. 129. 336.
16

Ibid., p. 334.

9

By early spring the problem had grown until local leaders were seeking solutions.

It was felt that a treaty could be concluded with the Indians and

that the problem could be solved peaceably.

Arrangements were made for a

meeting in Manti, April 9, 1865 . The meeting at the home of Jerome Kempton
was almost success ful and most of the problems seemed on the verge of being
solved when negotiations were interupted .
A group of interested whites and Indians had gathered in the front
yard of the Kempton home to learn what they could about the proceedings, and
tempers were high.

Many whites were angry over livestock that had been stolen.

Indians felt that they were being cheated and robbed by the whites . One of the
young Indians, a Sub-Chief Yenewood (also known as Jake Arropine), began to
argue and arouse the Indi ans.

John Lowry, one of the whites who had lost cattle

to the Indians , attempted to pacify Yenewood.
quarrel.

Yenewood and Lowry began to

George W. Bean , an interpreter and prominent citizen later stated

that the Black Hawk War was caused by John Lowry.

Bean claimed that Lowry

(a drunked interpreter) claimed a horse an Indian had and knocked him down and
beat him.

Bean went on to say, "our Indian troubles have general ly been brought

about by some foolish act of the white men. "

17

One of Lowry's friends shouted a warning that Yenewood was drawing
an arrow.

Lowry went to Yenewood's hors e to prevent the arrow from being

drawn a nd in the skirmish Yenewood was pulled from his horse and struck.

17

George W. Bean. Dictation. H. H. Bancroft Papers , University of
California at Berke ley. (Microfilm Copy , Utah State University, Logan, Utah),
Reel 2.

10

Seeing Yenewood attacked the other Indians came to his aid.

Breaking off

nego tiations , the Indians returned to their camps to spread the word.

Think-

ing whites began to prepare for the trouble they could expect.
Thus with years of misunderstanding and ignorance on both sides the
stage was set for the worst Indian war in Utah history.
Lowry for the start of the war.

Most accounts blame

Lowry did not deny his part in the war but

defended himself in a statement at a reunion of Black Hawk War veterans at
Manti.

Peter Gottfredson later reproduced a signed copy of the statement:
The occasion of the present re-union being opportune , in order
to correct an erroneous impression that has become wide-spread as
to what precipated the Black-Hawk War . I take this opportunity or
means of placing the facts before the world.
But first let me state that I came here as a pioneer, and took
part in the first battle fought with the Indians under command of Col.
John Scott. And I have in one way or another been associated with
almost every Indian trouble in the early history of this region. I
served as Indian interpre te r for years in Manti, and have pass ed
through many close places in dealing with the Red Men.
~rnl.864 a small band of Indians were wintering at Gunnison,
many of them died , and they found r eason for their trouble in conclusion that the Mormons had written their names and sent them to
satan , and he had caused death to come upon them. So in the ir
councils they were directed by the ir Chief to stop the sickness among
them by killing (Mormons) in retaliation. In February, Black Hawk
informed me what the Indians were going to do when the snow went
off. They would kill Mormons and eat Mormon beef. I immediately
went to my Bishop with the information. He thought, as did many
others that it was just Indian talk and amounted to nothing ; but the
Indians told me several times what they intended to do, and so I
went the second time to the Bishop. My story was received by him
saying "there are not enough of the m . "
ShoJtlY after I learned they were killing cattle. I had some
cattle on the range myself , and in my search for them I found the
skull of an ox which I had owned . . . I had always been a friend to
them, as had the Mormon people. I talked to them in such a way
that they agreed to pay me for the animal which had been killed by
fetching me a horse , and they did so the next day. I agreed to meet
with tham at Manti about the eighth of April and talk the matter over

11
of their killing our cattle . Accordingly the council took place.
It appeared the difficulty would be settled amicably, but a

certain young Indian present whose father had died during the
winter continued to halloo and make demonstrations, saying
that he would eat Mormon beef and kill Mormons when the snow
went off. I told him a time or two to stop and permit me to
finish my talk. Just them someone called "lookout, he is getting
his arrows." I rode up to him and turned him off his horse, and
pulled him to the ground. The bystanders interferred and we
were separated . .
In those days it was at times imperative
that harsh measures should be used . .
It was a question of
supermacy between the whitemen and the Indian. I have patiently
born the stigma placed upon me , for I knew the facts, and to
those who still persist in looking upon me as guilty of precipitating
the Black Hawk War , I will say this , that I appeal from their
decision to a higher court--our creator, who will ultimately judge
all men.
s / John Lowry
Stamped with the Commissioners of Indian War Records Seal. 1 8

18

Gottfredson, p. 335.

12

CHAPTER II

THE WAR

Indians Involved

With the misunderstandings between the Mormon and the Ute at a
combustible point the more aggressive Indi an leaders began to gain in influence.

The friendly relations between the Mormons and the Indian leaders

caused some young braves to resent Indian leadership.

The Mormons, while

having good relationships with the chiefs , ignored the young hot bloods.

Be-

cause of this relationship the Mormons were not prepared for hostilities.

The

state of prepardness in Mormon settlements appears to have been very low.
At the time of the outbreak of hostilities the Ute Indians were governed
by four chieftans and several sub-chiefs.

At the final negotiations at the

Spanish Fork Indian Farm when the Indians gave up all land but the Uintah
Basin Reservation all four chiefs and 15 sub-chiefs signed the agreement.

1

Of the chiefs, Kanosh, Sowiette, San Pitch, and Tabby, only San Pitch was
to participate in the war.
parties.

Several of the sub-chieftans became leaders of war

Black Hawk, for whom the war was named, was not present at this

conference, He probably did not rank high enough to sign an agreement of

1

neseret News, June 14, 1865.

13
this kind . With Chief Tabby le ading the way, most of the Indi ans moved onto
the reservation where they stayed throughout the war years.

Most of the

warriors to participate in the war we re young me n unhappy with th e Mormons
a nd their Indi an leaders .
Black Hawk, the sub-chief who became the principle War Chief, was
thought to be a Pah-Ute (Piute) .

2

He was born in the Southern part of Utah

Valley, and as a youth played with the white c hildren of the area . Bla ck Hawk
spoke English fluently as a result of his early a ssociation with the whites.
fa ther was Synnap Pich or Tenaciono (s ome thing tha t hangs on).

His

C. L.

Christensen, an Indian interpreter , stated the Synnap Pich was a chief of the
Sanpete ar ea. His mother was T anar-oh-wich (mother of boys ).

3

Black Hawk has bee n des cribed as be ing tall and s tately.
had a long nos e and looked as though he had a small mustache.
intellige nt and could ma ke up his mind in a hurry.

4

He supposedly

Black Hawk was

It was said th at more than

once as a youth he sat in Mormon meetings and liste ned to them plan defense
against the Indians.
Black Hawk showed evidence of having traits of strong conscience and
loyalty.

One man, Soren A. Sorensen, near Ephriam in 1867 was asked why

2
Josiah F . Gibbs, "Black Hawk's Last Raid," Utah Historical
Quarterly , IV (October, 1931), 484 .
3
4

c.

L. Christensen, Deseret News, September 29, 1919 .

Mary Goble Pay , Cited by Kate B. Carter, Our Pioneer Heritage
(Salt Lake City, Utah: Daughters of Utah Pionee rs, 1966) , p. 247.

14

Black Hawk had let him live but killed people within sight, said, "I cannot say
why, unless it was owing to the fact that when I was home with my parents,
my mother took a liking to the young Indian Black Hawk. "

5

Black Hawk was wounded at the battle of Gravelly Ford in June of
1866. His active participation in the war seems to have stopped them.

August

of 1867 found him on the reservation still suffering from his wound . Those who
saw him in the last months of his life attributed his death to tuberculosis caused
by his wound.

6

In 1869 Black Hawk, a sick man, appeared in Fillmore during a
Sacrament meeting and asked Bishop Callister if he could address the congregation.
When given permission, he stood to one side of the pulpit and asked forgiveness
for the damage he had done.
to visit each town.

He had gotten permission from military authorities

With an escort of seven or eight warriors, Black Hawk

visited every town between Cedar City and Payson, and made peace with the
people.

He was often provided an escort by citizens from town to town.

7

Black Hawk appeared at Parowan where he was met with the town's band,
and it was said that he was very pleased.
Green and Spring City.

5

He also appeared at Holden, Fountain

From reports of residents of these areas Black Hawk

Gottfredson, p. 172.

6

This seems unreasonable in relation to our knowledge of tuberculosis
causes today.
7

Gottfredson, p. 228 . See also Deseret News, October 6, 1934.

15
was ve r y ill.

He had lost considerably weight and was in pain.

8

Black Hawk ' s last days were spent near Spring Lake, Utah.

He died

there on September 26, 187 0, and was buried in the foothills east of Santaquin,
Utah.

9

An artic le in the De seret News, October 6 , 1934 , states that workers

in a nearby cane field saw Ute Indians carry Black Hawk' s body from his tent
and place it on a horse.
Santaquin.

The burial party moved into the foothills east of

10

Blac k Hawk could not have been very old at the time of his death . If
he played with Mormon boys as a youth he cou ld not have been much over ten
when the Mormons first settled the area. Any Indian boy ove r that age prob a bly
would not have time to play. If his association began in 1849 , when the Mormons
first settled Utah or Sanpete Counties, he would have been at the most twentyfive or thirty at the outbreak of the war and no older than his middle thirites
at the time of his death . The active daring type of campaigns he led testify
that he must have been young, not only in actions and deed, but in age.
Hawk was survived by three wives.

Black

There is no evidence indicating descendants .

The Ute tribe has no records earlier than 1947, due to fire.
Black Hawk was replaced as war chief by White Horse (Shi-Nav-Egin).
White Horse was given his name by white settlers because he always preferred
white horses . White Horse led many of the raids after Black Hawk was forced

8
9
10

neseret News , October 6, 1934.
Ibid., Septembe r 20, 1919 .

Ibid. , October 6, 1934 .

16
to retire .

11

ye ar 19 00.

White Horse died at the Hatch ranch in Grass Valley about the

12

The Piute , a southern branch of the Ute, we re also active during the
war . A meeting was held in Circleville April 21, 1866, at which time the
people were informed that the Piute, Ute, Piede, Pavan, and Navaho tribes
had united for the war.

13

While Piute actions were few in number , evidence

suggests that warriors from the tribe were prominent in the r aids of the Utes
farther North.

Most of the Piede and Pavan Indians stayed friendly to the

whites a nd proved valuable allies in tracking and recovering stolen stock in
Southern Utah.
The Navaho, whose homeland encompasses the Arizona, New Mexico ,
Southern Utah and Colorado area had raided the Northern Indi ans for slaves
before the white settler came.

Now, with an opportunity to participate in raids

against the whites, they became moderately active.

The first evidence that they

were allied with the Ute came from Indian Agent F. H. Head of the Utah
Territory. In a letter to Commissioner D. N. Cooley in Washington, Head
wrote;
"Sil':

"Black Hawk , a somewhat prominent chief of the Ute Indians,
has been engaged for more than a year past in active hostilities
11
12
13

Ibid.

See also Gottfredson, supplement, p . 3.

Gottfredson, supplement, p . 3.

Hilda Madsen Longdorf, Mt. Pleasant 1859-1939 (Salt Lake City ,
Utah: Stevens and Wallis, Inc., 1939) , p. 108.

17
against the settlements in the southern portion of the territory.
His band consisted at first of but forty four men , who were
mostly outlaws and desperate characters from his own and
other tribes. During the summer and autumn of 1865 he made
several successful forays upon the weak and unprotected settlements in Sanpete and Seviere Counties. Killing in all thirty two
whites . . forty of his warriors were killed.
. On the
20th instant he again commenced his depredations . . . his band
from what I consider entirely reliable information, now numbers
about one hundred warriors, one-half of whom are Navahos from
New Mexico. 14
In Southern Utah almost all of the Indian activities were by the Navaho,
wr.o began their raids in January of 1866 and continued until 1871. Navaho actions
continued unilaterally after the Utes withdrew from hostilities in 1868. While
their raids were usually small and limited in damage they succeeded in supsetting
the Southern border area for several years.

The White Militia

The main defensive force during the war was the Nauvoo Legion, which
had its beginning when the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints was
located in Nauvoo, illinois. After the move to Utah the legion was soon active
in iefense of the territory. At the outbreak of the Black Hawk troubles, when
the U.S. Government refused aid, the legion became by default the instrument
by which people defended their homes .

The Nauvoo Legion served throughout

the Black Hawk hostilities but most of the time it was a makeshift army serving
wih poor weapons and without pay.

14

F. H. Head, Indian Affairs Reports, April 30, 1966 .

18
The Legion was the only military force in Utah from 1847 until
Thited States troops settled Camp Floyd . During this period the Territory
ststained sporadic Indi an attacks and the Wal ker War . Indian troubles forced
t•rritorial officers to keep some of the militia on reserve . As the popul ation
o the area increased the Indian activities moved to the more sparsely settled
atd remote areas of the territory.

Especially hard hit were the ranching areas.

It was easy for the Indians to r a id horse and cattle herds and effect escape.
Gten the Indians would be mile s and days away before the animals were missed
o· enough men could be gathered to offer effective pursuit.
With the advent of federal territorial officers, any mustering and drillitS of local militia units were forbidden.

Federal officers preferred to place

tbir confidence in federal troops stationed at Camp Floyd and later at Fork
Douglas . Any attempt to muster the militia was met with suspicion and hostiity .
The Legion eventually became essentially a social organization.

Often

C.urch of civic leaders were elected officers of the Legion for prestige or
scial reasons.

When trouble did cause the use of the Legion many of the

oficers who had been promoted simply for social reasons , were not the type
n•eded for active participation in a war.

At the start of the war military units

hal to be mustered and equipped before action could be taken . This lack of
prpardness cost the settlers in lives and livestock.
Under the Territorial law in the 1860's the Governor was the Supreme
Ccrnmander of the militia. In this respect the militia of the 1860's can be

19
compared with the National Guard of today . Since the Governor was a federal
appointee, serious problems could have been caused by his lack of co-operation.
Both Governor Duane Doty and Charles Durkee co-operated as best as they
could with the militia officials . No Governor except Brigham Young up to that
time ever acted as the commander and authority rested in the elected Lieutenant
General.

During the war period this continued to be Daniel H. Wells.
The Territory of Utah was divided into military districts with a General

Officer in command of each.

The make up of the local military units depended

upon the number of people in each district.

15

The military commanders of the Sanpete District during this war were
General Warren K. Snow and General William B. Pace, who replaced Snow in
1867 . General Erastus Snow commanded the Iron County district in Southern
Utah.
General Warren Snow, the first General to become involved, was not
a young man.

While he was active he proved to be overly cautious. He scored

one significant victory over the Indians at Fish Lake in the year-and-a-half he
commanded the Sanpete region.

He served well in organizing companies and

guard units for local protection but he was not the vigorous leader the area
needed at the time. General Snow was replaced by General William B. Pace in
April of 1867.
healt h.

The only reason shown for General Snow's replacement was

He was wounded in 1865, and did get out of a sick bed at Glenwood in
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March of 1867, to organize a pursuit. He was cautious in several instances
and may have provoked mutinous feelings in his officers.

Certainly the General

was no coward.
General Pace had been active in the Nauvoo Legion since the age of 15 .
He authored one book on military tactics in 1865 . General Pace let at least
one victory slip from his hands.
was also cautious.

The Gravelly Ford incident indicated that he

The fact that his men were not able to kill any Indians in

this battle and yet exhaust their ammunition suggests that his men were not well
trained.

By the time of this battle , June 10, 1866, the war was one year old .

Surely leaders could have found time to train men in the effective use of firearms.
In the Southern end of the territory the situation was quite different.
General Erastus Snow took command instantly and began effective actions.
While he did not participate in any expeditions he did provide able leaders.
General Snow advanced two very capable men, Colonel James Andrus and
Colonel J.D. L. Pierce, from Captains because of their successful leadership
and achievements in defeating Indians and recovering stolen animals.
Every able man in the war area served in some capacity during hostilities.

Young men served in the cavalry or infantry and men over forty-five

served in the Silver-Greys, or home guard.

Each man was responsible for
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his own weapons, and this mea nt that there were many different types of
weapons and ammunition. Rifles ranged from the modern cap and ball to the
musket of years earlier.

Each man furnished his own gear; if cavalry , his

horse and saddle.
During 1866 militia actions and defensive measures taken by the settlements proved to be so effective that the war degenerated into small r a ids on
livestock herds and travelers . By 1867-68 the tide has turned and the militia
and defenses began to cost the Indians more than they gained; they began to
lose most of the stock stolen and suffer greater losses of men .
Even though Indian depredations continued in parts of the territory
after 1870, Governor J. W. Shaffer refused to allow further musters of the
militia or drills.

All military units were to be withdrawn and official actions

ceased on this date .
Prompt effective action in the south held the raids to a minimum while
amateurish efforts in the north in 1865 only served to encourage the Indians.
It was not until after serious effor ts in 1866 that depredations in the north

slackened .
The first military action came from Mt . Pleasant. After receiving
word of the Indian raid at Twelve Mile Creek, militia units were organized
that functioned as long as there was a threat to the area.
General Snow as the district commander and his most active subordinate
Colonel Reddick Allred were both active leaders.
the end of hostilities .

Colonel Allred served until

22
In a reorganization of the Legion at Mr. Pleasa nt on July 15, 1865 ,
two companies of cavalry were organ ize d and one of home guard.

Capta in

Lauritz La r son was made commander of A Company, Jacob Christens e n Captain
of B Company and Captain John Tidwell was made the comm a nder of the Home
Guard (Silve r-Greys) comprised of o lder men.

On October 3, on the advice of

President Young, the Mt . Pleasant unit was deactivated . This move was pre matu re and the unit was called to duty on the 17th of the month to pursue Indians
who had success full y gotten away with over 20 0 head of c a ttle.
In the year 1866 the militi a units of ce ntral Utah served under the
command of General Wells who moved sou th to conduct the campaigns.

The men

of the ce ntr a l part of the terr itory had the double problem of serving with the
militia and taking care of the ir homes and farms at the same time . Whe n they
were not pursuing Indians some were standing guard while the others worked
in the ir fields.

This group of me n must be c lassed as minuteme n while those

who came from the Salt L a ke r egion could be classified as mili tary units .
There are no records of a id given by ·the Northern part of the territory
for the year 1865.

When it became evident th a t Indian problems were going to

continue in 1866 , men and equipment were soon on their way from the Sa lt La ke
region.

The first units to reach the be leagued area arrived May 5.

They were

us ed to provide guards for se ttlers abandoning their homes on the Upper Sevier
River.
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By the first of June , military units had arrived from Utah , Sa lt La ke
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and Davis Counties. Reinforcements moved into the central area until October
of the year, the last company arriving was that of Captain Robert Davis of
Kaysville . The last company of Northern militia to return home was tha t of
Colonel John Sharp who reached Salt Lake City in early November, 1866.
Northern units were involved in several major battles and prove d as e ffective
as any units in the field.

Efforts this year were to be the biggest of the war.

Be fore the years end some 2, 500 men had been involved against an estimated
force of 300 Indians .
Northern aid came earlier the next year.

On April 15, 1867, General

We lls called upon General Robert T. Burton of the Salt Lake district to raise
three platoons of cavalry , seventy-two me n, to march for Sanpete on the 22nd,
under Captain Orson P. Miles.

18

On May 22, Captain William L. Binder a nd

a small company of infantry reported to General Pace.

Captain Binde r a nd his

company spent most of the time they we r e in the area working on the neve r
finished Fort Gunnison .
Men· and supplies continued to be sent from the North but in smaller
numbers as the Indian attacks diminished.

By 1868 the war had degene r ated

into small raids on livestock that were considered normal and the war for all
practical purposes considered over . Without the contribution of the Northern
area it is likely that the Central part of the territory would have been abandoned
to the Indians.
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The major problem of the militia was that of supply.
was scarce and dependable weapons in short supply.

Ammunition

The area in which most

of the hostilities took place was remote from any large center of commerce.
Military units going into the field were often limited in supplies of all kinds .
The Indians had reduced the horse herd so that pack animals were often not
available, the men had to depend on what they could carry . Several times the
militia were reduced to dry crackers and water during a campaign.

19

New

supplies were days away and often the smallest item loomed large in importance.

George W. Bean, Quartermaster of the Sanpete region had to request

horseshoes and horseshoe nails more than once .

One message in June of

1867 asked that they be hurried because there were now south of Salt Lake City .

Supplies of this kind could have and should have been stored during the winter
months.
At the start of the war the settlers gathered what lead they could find
and made bullets of the different sizes needed . As is shown in a statement of
Josiah Sylvester ammunition was often scarce and little could be wasted.
I was out of ammunition and was informed that Elijah B. Ward
had been seen moulding bullets for his pistol, which was the size
I wanted. Someone went with me to get them. It was dark and we

19
City, Utah.
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had no light. As Ward ' s corpse was laid out on the trunk or chest,
we had to raise him up, while I searched for the bullets until I
found them. 2 1
One problem that faced not only the men in the field but those who tried
to furnish supplies was money.
without pay.

Most of the men served throughout the war

General Pace later commented that he never received a penny

for his three years service during the• Blake Hawk War.

22

The State Legis,-

lature seemed inclined to ignore the war in their appropri ations of 1866-67 .
Military appropr iations for these two years were $1, 016. 36 for supplies and
$3,000 to furnish the office of the Adjutant General.

23

This meant that every-

thing e lse used had to be furnished by the Church, settlement, or the men
involved.

The people of Ephraim were taxed over $6 ,000 just to maintain

guards during the war.

One citizen of Mt. Pleasant stated:

My portion was $75 . 00 a year. Some men could not fit themse lves out and we were ordered to let them have articles they could
use and receive cred it for them. Besides the assessment I furnished
a horse, bridle and saddle , kept them on hand for them, a long with
one Ballard rifle, and one cap and ball pistol, others did likewise . 2 4
The supply problem was exc lusi vely that of the territory.

Attempts to get aid

21
Josiah Sylvester, "A utobiography," Utah State Archives, Territorial
papers , 1864-69, box 3, p. 1.
22

Wil li am B. Pace.

23

utah Legislative Record, 1866 -67 . Microfilm , Utah State University
Library , Logan, Utah, p. 2.
24

Andrew Madsen, Journal cited by Longdorf, p. 98 .

26
from the Federal Government were futile.
The people of Utah, not being militant in nature, had not placed great
emphasis on firearms; as a result, the war found many men to be poorly armed
and in a situation where this lack could not be easily remedied.
The leaders of Utah, knowing the territory could not afford a war and
did not have a trained army, looked for help.

After the first Indi an attack in

the Mt. Pleasant area local officials appea led to Colonel 0. H. Irish, the Indi an
Agent.

Colonel Irish appealed to Colonel Patrick Connor, the commander of

the California Volunteers who were stationed at Fort Douglas, near Salt Lake
City.

Colonel Connor replied that if the deprediations were committed upon

settlements remote from the mail line he cou ld not furnish help.
has come in for much criticism because of his stand.
been too harsh.
them.

The Colonel

Perhaps critics have

A military man who had order could not completely ignore

The Indian raids were far enough from the major East-West mail

rou tes that his men would have been gone for weeks.
In the spring of 1866 Colonel F. H. Head, the new Indi an Agent, called
again on the new commander at the fort for aid.
instructions.

Colonel Potter wired east for

General Dodge at Fort Leavenworth sent this reply May 2, 1866.

General Pope telegraphs that the superintendent of Indian
affairs will have to depend for the present on the militia to
25
compel the Indians to behave.
General Pope's reply to Colonel Head's request sealed the matter of
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federal aid . No further appeals were made to the Government for men.

There

is nothing to indicate that the militia sought material from the government in
the form of weapons or ammunition.

Types of Warfare

The type of warfare used by the Ute during the war was almost
exclusively hit and run.
fixed position.

There is only one account of Indians attacking a

The Indians did not attempt to attack the larger settlements.

The settlements that were attacked were small and isolated and were limited
to attempts to steal the livestock.
livestock.

Targets for Indian attacks were always

Because of the large amounts of feed needed for the livestock the

animals were grouped together and hereded by assigned men or boys.

26

These

herds became the primary targets of the Indians and usually the few herders
the victims.

More than once the Indians attacked and escaped with herds of

over 200 animals.

Because of the remoteness of the herd or lack of organized

pursuit the Indians were often days and many miles away from the scene before
organized pursuit was possible.
During 1865 and the first part of 1866 almost every Indian raid was
successful.

Indians would scout a promising area and lay in wait until the

opportunity came for a raid.
tactics.

As late as 1867 they were still using the same

A memo to General Wells from General Pace, July 17, 1867, stated:
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"All quiet but signs of Indian spies in the hills daily. "

27

There were three definite tactics used successfully by the Ute . The
first was used during a successful raid . A few of the Indians would continue
to drive the stolen animals while the rest prepared an ambush for the pursuing
militia.

This technique worked well enough that very few stolen animals were

ever recovered.

Usually the militia would draw off because of darkness or

being outnumbered and short of ammunition, and the Indians would easily
escape .
The Indians used this tactic on their first raid and it was so successful
they used it everytime an opportunity arose.

The frustration of constant Indian

success can be summed up by Josiah S. Sylvester's statement:
That was the way it was all the time. The Indians would sit
on the mountains and see where our stock were and what we were
doing and making a dash would kill people that were at work in the
fields or traveling the road , rush their stock into the mountains ,
leaving some to drive them on whi le others fell back and waited in
ambush on the trail for those who pursued. We hardly ever met
them without them having the advantage. 28
A second tactic was one used when the raid was unsuccessful or pursuit getting too close.

The Indians would divide their party into several small

groups and each group take a different route to their destination . Most militi a
commanders would halt their pursuit and turn back rather than spend time
tracking just a few Indians or risking the threat of dividing their commands

27
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and being ambushed.

Often the Indians would kill or cripple the slow or hard

to manage livestock before conceding defeat and dividing into groups for
escape .
The third tactic used repeatedly was that of attacking travelers.
wagons or small groups were game for the Indians.

Single

Several people were killed

and many wounded attempting to travel without proper protection.
Until the militia was able to provide enough pressure in 1866 and 1867
to make the raids costly the Indians had things their own way . With the incr eased
number of militia units and more forceful pursuit the Indians were forced on the
defensive and eventually into inactivity.
Militia field tactics were based on standard military theory of the
period.

Cavalry units were assigned to settlements prone to attack and stayed

ready to pursue at a moments notice . But, because of the distances and slow
c ommunication,these units were usually ineffective.

Major Conflicts

The first meeting between the militia and the Indians came about after
t

raid on the Twelve Mile Creek Indian Farm. A group of Mormons had gone

:o gather their cattle from the farm the day after the Manti talks of May 10 ,
1865 . Black Hawk , leading a small group of warriors , successfully ambushed
he Mormons, killed one and escaped with the cattle.
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Black Hawk led his band south to the Salina area where they joined with
Indians from the Richfield area.

After gathering more cattle the Indians moved

into Salina Canyon and Eastern Utah . While moving through Salina Canyon the y
met and killed two settlers who were unaware of Indian problems .

30

On May 12, a militia unit of 84 me n under Colonel Reddick Allred began
the pursuit.

About ten miles up Salina Canyon the militia was a mbushed when

passing through a narrow section in single file.

Surprised , untrained , and in a

difficult position the men retreated leaving two dead .

31

On May 14, the reinforced militia again entered the canyon where they
recovered the bodies of their fallen companions.

They continued to follow the

Indians into the mountains be tween Fish Lake a nd the Colora do River, where
they caught up with Black Hawk's party. A battle e nsued and several Indians
were reported killed.

The Indi ans were never the less able to get away with all

of the stolen livestock , a nd the militia returned home empty handed.
The Indians struck next at a ranch in Thistle Valley.

At daybreak on

May 24, they killed and mutil a ted a sleeping fa mily consisting of John Givin ,
his wife and four children. Two employees of Givin escaped becau se they were
sleeping in a wagon box away from the cabin and had the wisdom to keep quiet
when awakened by screams. After the Indians gathered their plunder and
escaped the two men went for help .
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In an action they often repeated the Indians killed the small calves
to allow faster movement of the stolen livestock. They escaped with nearly
200 head of cattle and horses.

Militia failed to overtake the raiders.

After several weeks of relative inactivity the Indians raided the Salina
area on July 15.

General Snow and the newly reorganized militia accepted the

challenge and moved east into the mountains.

In a valley east of Salina the

militia surrounded the Indian rear guard and attacked.
Indians were killed and two escaped.

In this battle twelve

The main body of Indians continued to

push the livestock into the wilderness . General Snow divided his command ,
sending half back to guard the settlements and pursuing the Indians with the
remainder.

This pursuit was well described by Andrew Madson in his journal.

Orange Seeley, N. P. Madsen, Alma Zabriskie, Myself and
others from Mt. Pleasant were in Snow's company. As soon as
possible we started on the trip trying to secure the cattle from the
Indians. We camped the first night at the head of Salina Canyon.
Then we went down the Canyon into a large valley (now Emery
County). We did most of our traveling at night in order to avoid
the attention of Indians. We crossed a large creek and journeyed
over Buck Horn Flat where we were joined by Allred and his
company who had taken the trail to the north, [colonel Allred had
brought his men from Salina to take part in the pursuit .J We camped
on the Price River that night and the following morning we moved on
south and east to the Green River by daylight. We did not see any
Indians but could see where they had driven the cattle through the
river. Here the company stopped for breakfast. On the other side
of the river we could see fresh wichiups made of green trees. The
river was too high to ford. Dolph Bennett, John Sanders and Jens
Larson were chosen as advance guards to swim across to investigate.
John Sanders very nearly drowned, but was rescued by Bennett.
The advance men upon reaching the other shore found a great many
fresh tracks ot the Indians, and called back to tell their find. After
scouting about a short time they returned across the river to the
balance of the company. Most of the company wanted to follow the
tracks, but upon taking inventory of their supplies, which now consisted of cracker crumbs only, the officers decided on account of
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the jaded condition of the horses and the lack of supplies, to give
up the chase and return home . Years later, Chief Jake Arropine
told that the Indians were hiding among the bushes and trees and
could easily have shot and killed the advance men and others had
they wanted to ; when asked why they had not done so , he said
that they had intended to fire when all the men were across or
crossing and had gotten into the river , "then the water would have
been red." We started homeward across the mountain, over rough
trails, through canyons and deep washes, by way of the place called
"Hole in the Rocks . " We were two days and a half without food,
with the exception of a spoonful of cracker crumbs dished out to
each man for a meal. While we saw no Indians, we were interupted
now and again by wild beasts of the mountain. In Rock Canyon , on
the other side of the mountain, we were met by a party from home
who brought provisions to us, they, in attempting to reach us had
been delayed by losing their way in the mountains . There was much
rejoicing the following morning when we pitched our camp in Ephriam,
having been gone about two weeks. 32
After returning to Mt . Pleasant the men were feted and rested.

Those

chosen for the standing army were then stationed in a hay field outside of town
where they could march at a moment's notice.
Activities again subsided until about the middle of September when
General Snow received word from Colonel Allred that the Indians intended to
attack Circleville.

General Snow and a company moved south to prevent the

expected attack . On the 21st of September while they were camped near
Fish Lake , General Snow and Colonel John I vie were fired on.

In a pitched

battle fourteen Indians were killed and three militia were wounded, including
General Snow, who suffered a serious shoulder wound in the first exchange
of fire.

During the night the militia moved to Grass Valley where they camped,

and the next day returned home.
32
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In March of 1866, Chief Kanosh sent word to the authorities at
Mt. Pleasant that a large party of Indians was camped in. the Nephi hills
between the towns of Nephi and Mt. Pleasant.

With the help of Chief Kanosh 's

son, Jake, the Indians were surrounded and all but one were captured by the
militia.

The one refused to surrender and was killed.

hostile Indians who were arrested.

Jake then identified the

The remainder of the group was considered

friendly and released.
With Jake's testimony four of the hostile Indians were condemned to
death, and the rest ordered to jail. A detail of militia carried out the executions.

34

One of the Indians sent to jail was Sanpitch, a chief who had broken

the reservation treaty that was signed in Spanish Fork in June of 1865 .
Chief Sanpitch and seven companions were able to break jail March 14,
1866, and escape.

The possee which pursued Sanpitch cornered him in Birch

Canyon between Fountain Green and Moroni on March 18.
surrender and was killed.
get out of Mt. Pleasant.

He refused to

Three of the Indians were killed while trying to
General Snow killed one with the stock of his gun

as he was jumped at night.

The four who escaped were trailed into the

mountains between Sanpete and Juab Valleys where they were killed. 35
The largest Indian raid of the war occurred Sunday, June 11, 1866.
Striking Round Valley (Scipio) about noon with an estimated 200 warriors
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Black Hawk killed two men and swept from three to five hundred head of livestock into the hills.
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When General Pace, who was then in central Utah with a military
command, received the news of the raid he assumed the Indians would cross
the Sevier River at Gravelly Ford near Salina.

While the militia was moving

toward the ford a dust cloud was seen approaching from the west.

Assuming

the dust to be the Indians , the General knew he had to beat them to the crossing
or the stock would be lost.

The Indians had prepared their own ambush at the

ford and fired on the approaching militia . The militia outnumbered the ambushers
and were able to drive them off, only to be repulsed by more Indians coming up
from the arriving stock. While some of the Indians pushed the stock across the
ford and into the mountains the rest engaged the militia.

For several hours,

the force of seventy-five to eighty Indians and the militia fought on even terms.
The Indians were able to surround the militia who retreated to the top of a
small hill.
A militiaman named James E . Snow was able to get a shot at an Indian
behind a horse.

Guessing that he could shoot through the horse and hit the

Indian , he tried.

At his shot, Snow reported , both horse and Indian fell.

Indian was ab le to escape with the help of two companions .

37

The

It was not known

at the time but this wounded Indi an was none other than Black Hawk , who was to
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mffer from this wound the rest of his life.

He was not able to lead the a ttac ks

ute r this date and became less importa nt.
Just as the battle seemed to turn in favor of the militia a cloud of
cust was observed in the west.

Thinking th a t more of the raiding Indians

vere approaching and knowing his me n were about out of ammunition, General
l'ace and his officers decided to break off the action and retire.

This they did,

mlowing the Indians to escape with all o f the ir booty . The dust c loud was a
t·oop of seventy cavalry from Fillmore under the command of Captain J ames
C. Owens.

Before the troops could be reorganized and ammunition distributed

tte Indi ans were so far away immediate pursuit was ineffec tive .
Black Hawk's raid on Round Va lley so unnerved its population that they
blcame doubly cautious, thus giving the Indi a ns the chance to make good their
eJcape.

The first messenger from the area was not allowed to leave until

a'ter 10 p. m. to insure his safety.

38

Shortly after the departure of the messe nger , Captain Owens had his
nen gathered and prepared to pursue the Indi a ns.

The men were intstructed

t• take bread and fried meat for food because no fires would be allowed , nor
tine given to prepare food.
The Fillmore militia departed after dark in a pouring rain the night
o June 11 , 1866.

Following the trail proved to be easy because of the Indi a n

htbi t of killing the slower or hard to manage animals.
38
39

Gibbs , p . 4 85.
Ibid. , p. 481.

39

After fording at

36
least one stream in flood, and riding all night, much of it in rain, Captain
Owens should be forgiven of his classic statement of "What the Hell," when
he saw General Pace and his men retreating at Gravelly Ford.

The only

casualty to be seen on the Gravelly Ford battle ground was the imported
stallion of James Ivie that Black Hawk had stolen in Round Valley the day
before.

40
The stage was now set for one of the largest and most prolonged

a ttempts of the war to punish the Indians .

Colonel H. C. Kimball and his

c avalry from Fountain Green joined with General Snow and Captain Owens,
who were near Salina the next day, to start pursuit.
Salina Canyon.

The militia moved up

At noon they came upon the place where the Indians had camped

the night before. Here General Snow, over the protest of some younger officers, decided that without heavy reinforcements a chase would be futile and
withdrew.
Arriving back h't Gunnison, General Snow found General Daniel H.
Wells, the Commander of the Territorial Militia who had come from Salt Lake
to assume command of the region.

A company of Cavalry under command of

Colonel John R. Winder, and one of infa ntry under command of Major William
W. Casper were assigned to General Snow's command.
immediate pursuit to try and recover the stock.
Salina into the canyons of Eastern Utah.
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General Wells ordered

The militia returned through

They found later that the first pursuit

37
lad put them within twelve miles of the stolen stock. The second expedition
vas in the hi lls three days when retreat was ordered . Both men and anaimals
mffered greatly from thirst in the rough arid country.
mccessful.

Again the Indians were

This raid, even though Black Hawk was wounded, could not have

lut provided inspiration for others .
Shortly after the Gravelly Ford battle Captain Albert Peter Dewey with
f

company of Infantry were ordered to establish a camp in Thistle Valley.

Captain Dewey had scouts in the nearby hills to warn of Indian attack.
cf the scouts saw Indians and attempted to warn the camp.

Two

Before reaching

atfety one of them was wounded but he was helped into camp before dying.
Pnother set of scouts, seeing the Indians between themselves and the camp,
vent to nearby Fairview for help.
Captain Dewey had fortified his camp with baggage wagons and dead
t:ees from the area.

The camp, however , was located in a grove of Juniper

t;ees which gave protection to the attackers .
The scouts going to Fairview met Colonel John !vie and a group of
nili tia who were guarding a herd of cattle.

Colonel !vie and his men arrived

a the scene in time to rescue Captain Dewey and his men from defeat.
WlS

estimated that there were over 100 Indians compared to 37 militia.

It
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The last battle between Indians and Militia came in the northern part
o· the war area.
41
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stealing about 50 horses and 20 he ad of cattle.

The Springville Militi a, under

the command of Colonel William Creer, followed the raiders into Mapleton
Canyon. After pursuing them up the canyon and ove r the divide into Di a mond
Canyon, Colonel Creer's men caught and began firing on the Indians who
r e turned fire .
The Indians, thinking they could defeat the militia , began an atta ck of
their own.

Evidently the Indians were going to surround the militi a but were

surprised by another company of militia coming from Mapleton.

After several

hours of ineffective shooting Colonel Creer selected five of his best marksmen
a nd had them concentrate the fire on the War Chief, an estimated 800 yards
away.

On the fifth volley the Chief was seen to fall from his horse.

Chief e ither dead or \\Qunded the Indi ans retreated behind the hill.
a llowed to e scape but left behind a ll of the sto len livestock.
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With the
They were

This was the

first time the militia had r ecovered a ll livestock stolen in any one raid.

The War in the South

The war in Southe rn Utah, while a part of the general hostilities, was
different.

There were fewer ranches and the people more isolated than in the

central region. The Navaho raided both cattle and horse herds but wa s also
s ucce ssful in stealing sheep.
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John R . Winder , Journal, Military Records , Territoria l Militia-Nauvoo Legion corresponde nce, 1857- 1877. Utah State Archives, box 8.
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Most of the raids were by small bands of Navaho.

There were some

Piedes involved but it appears that they were few in number.

Most of the

local Indians remained loyal to the settlers and often served as guides or
scouts for the militia.

There is at least one account of livestock being

returned by Piedes after it had been stolen by the Navaho.
Because of the difficult terrain and lack of water in much of Southern
Utah the herds tended to be smaller.

It was much more difficult to move live-

stock through the wilderness because of the deep canyons and sheer ledges.
Because of this the militia actions were much more successful than they were
in other areas.

There were no raids in which 100 Indians got away with two

or three hundred head of livestock.
General Erastus Snow, the commander of the Iron District, took
positive action and was credited with limiting the scope of the war.

After the

first travelers were killed by Indians, travel was restricted to groups large
enough to defend themselves . Martial law was declared and every available
man was mustered into the militia.
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General Snow had scouting patrols

in the hills most of the time and attempted to prevent attacks.

Most ranches

were ordered abandoned early and were not reocuppied until the threat was
over.

General Snow promoted effective leaders who were largely responsible

for the positive action he advocated.
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Angus M. Woodbury, "A History of Southern Utah and Its Parks,"
Utah Historical Quarterly, XII (July-October, 1944), 170.
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The major offensive action of the war was an attempt to locate the
trails us ed by Indians in crossing the Colorado River.

This expedition was in

the hills 60 days during August and Septe mber of 1866, and covered an estimated 460 miles .
A second large expedition was sent to attempt the recovery of stolen
livestock in February of 1869.

This company returned home 16 days later

after covering 384 miles and seeing neither Indian or livestock.
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General Snow kept guards at th e important river crossings a nd
mountain passes.

Thi s was instrumental in limiting the scope of the war but

was not accomplished without problems and dependence on Indian alli es.
"Fort Kanab, November 5, 1869.
"Pres E. Snow.
"We have not sufficient men to guard the fort . Ten Indian
warri ors is all we have to depend on. We want at least ten good
men we ll armed and if we had of had we wo uld of prevented all
of this raiding. We have two horses fit for service and twelve
head which are a detriment t o us. As provisions we have tolerable being at home here, but if we were to go out we would have
nothing but bread to take with us. You will see from the above
that we are not situated to guard the two passes. We s hall start
ten Indians and one of our men tomorrow morning for the north
trail, we will be left with two men with a few old sick and crippled
Indians . We will do the best we can until help comes. We should
have some tobacco for the Indians.
45
"s/T. C. Judd"
There were indic ations that the Navaho was getting he lp from other than
Indi an allies.
44
45

E. G. Wooley, an officer in the militia , reported a fter one

Edwin G. Wooley, Journal, Microfilm, Utah Historical Society .

Territorial Militia--Nauvoo Legion corr espondence, 1869-1875,
Utah State Archives, box 7.
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;krimish tha t the rifle reports sounded like that of Spencers . The Spe ncer
·ifle was then one of the most modern on the market.
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Another report indi-

'ated that white men were involved in some actio ns .
"S. George, March 8, 1869.
''Indians report to J. Bamblin that a large number of Navahos
a r e south on the other side of the Colorado--said to be aided by
whitemen and well supplied with guns and ammunitions--h ave
whipped the small tribes south of the Colorado and threate ned t o
prey upon us--no news ye t from Captain Copelan--no sign in this
ne ighborhood.
47
"s / He nry Ryring Adjt."
~here

are no reports of white me n being ide ntified by the militia.
The Navaho raids diminished gradua lly and by 1871 the th reat was

' irtu ally e liminated . Military vigilance and treaties concluded by the Governn ent in New Mexico r e moved the threat.

The southern part of the ter ritory

<arne out of the war with less than one-fourth the losses of central Utah.

Heber Valley

Heber Valley settlers on the northern fringe of the war zo ne a nd wes t
cf

the new reservation expected Indi a n troubles.

While Indian actions in their

:rea were few they upset the lives of the settlers for part of thre e years.

In

! pril of 1866, as part of the terri to rial preparation plan, orders were issu e d
ty General Wells to reorgani ze and prepare the militia unit for possible trouble.
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Edwin G. Wooley, Journal.
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Colonel Robert T. Burton was se nt from Salt Lake City to direc t prepar a tions.
The first order of business was to place guards in the most used
mountain passes.

Large corrals wer e cons tructed to protect the lives tock

and the militia reorganized.

Three companies of cavalry were organized a nd

one of Home Guard . The militia units were given two days of tr ai ning and
declared ready . Settlers on scattered farms were moved into Heber for the
du ration.
The Indians was ted little time in testing the newly organi zed militia .
Near the middle of May, Indi ans were s uc cess ful in s teal ing forty to fifty
hor ses.

The Hebe r Militia were no more s uccessful than their counterparts

e lsewher e.
Indians raided the va lley in July but lost the stolen livestoc k and their
own horses in getting away.
hostilities for the year.

Three horse stealing raids in August c lim axed

In the spring of 1867 the valley leaders we r e

successful in halting Indi an problems. As described by John Crook:
The spring of 1867 was late and the snow deep in the hills. We
put out our guards , but no Indi a ns troubled us until the middle of
July .
A special scout, John Cummings who had on a cert ain
occasion found in a s ide canyon an Indian who had skinned an ox.
Mr. Cummings covered the Indi an with his rifle and drove him
ahead of him to Heber City where he was kept under guard three
days. A court marshall decide d to write a note to Chief T abby ,
advising him to keep his Indi ans at home , and also asking T abby
to come over and m ake peace wi th us. We gave the note to the
Indian and told him to go immed ia tely to the reservation, give
the note to Chief Tabby like a good Indian . Two guards went with
him to see him over the ridge .
About a month later, or about the 15th or 2 0th of August
Chief Tabby with his whole tribe , squaws, papooses and peaceable
Indians that he could control came he r e. The Chief said that he
c ould not control those of his Indi ans who were with Black Hawk.
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We had a bowery in which we he ld summer meetings, and in this
we set large tables , and the ladies furnished a good picnic for
the Indians. An ox was killed and roasted, and the Indians filled
up good ; the pipe of peace was passed around, and the Indians
after stopping a few days returned home with a few good presents.
On leaving our valley these Indians stole thirty of our horses. 4 8
With the visit from Chief Tabby , Indian problems ended for the area.
~h e

most significant action of Heber Valley Militia units occurred when they

!e rved as escorts to Indian Supreintendent F. H. Head , as he made journeys
into the Uintah Basin in May and June of 1866 seeking peace .

The people of Utah took various measures of defense at the sta rt of
he war.

One method involved the construction of several forts.

Black Hawk

rod his followers in the hit and run attacks did not tend to bother large groups
cf people.

Most forts did not have a shot fired from them . Some, howeve r,

dd s e rve as holding corrals for live stock.
Fort Deseret, the first to be completed , was located about one mile
routh of present day Fillmore. Under direction of Apostle Amasa Lyman and
Iishop Thomas Callister, construction was started in June of 1865.

The fort

cwered about two acres . The walls of the fort were eighteen inches thick and
t•n feet high, made of adobe . The foundations were three and one-half feet
t1ick and made of lava rock.
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Uah.

There were bastions in two corners to cover

John Crook, "Autobiography," Utah Historical Society , Salt Lake City,
(Typewritten.)
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the surrounding area, and gun slits for rifles along the walls . The adobe
used in the fort was made from cl ay and straw . Ninety-eight men divide d
into two companies finished the fort on the 25th of July.
never actually used, but it did figure in the war.
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Fort Desere t was

In the spring of 1866 Black

Hawk and seventy-two warriors appeared near Fillmore.

50

When asked if they

wanted food they insinuated they could take all the food they wanted.

The dis-

cussion was held within sight of the finishe d fort . It was felt that seeing the
prepardness of the citizens influenced the Indians to change their minds about
the raid . After spending the night in the area, Black Hawk and his men left
peaceably. A military detachment assigned to keep them under surveillance
reported they left without trouble . The visit proved to be a good scouting
trip, however, for the raid on June 11 .

51

Part of the walls of Fort Desere t

still stand.
Fort Sanford was constructed be tween Circleville and Panguitch to
offer protection to the s e ttle me nts of the upper Sevier River.

The fort was

a stockade located about seven miles north of Panguitch near Louder's Spring.
It was built under the direction of Captain Silas Sanford Smith in Mar c h, 186 6 ,

by a detachment of seventy-six men, from Beaver and Iron Counties.
49
City, Utah.
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Fort

Henry Savage, "Biography," Utah Historical Society, Salt Lake
(Typewritten.)
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Robert L. Ashby, Family History of Thomas Waters Cropper.
Brigham Young 'University , Provo, Utah. p. 33 .
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Ibid.

carrie Allen, History of Circleville (Richfield , Utah: Richfield
Press, 1966), p. 5. See also,Woodbury , p. 169 .
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Sanford was occupied at various periods by troops from Beaver, Para won,
Circleville and Panguitch. It was evacuated November 30, 1866.
It was decided in 1866 to build a fort in the town of Mt. Pleasant.

':'he fort was started June 4, and completed June 19 , 1867 . The walls enclosed

~bout fiv e acres and were made of rock and adobe. 53 The major purpose of
the fort it appears was to serve as a corral for cattle.

Nothing indicates the

fort was ever used for protection against Indians .
Fort Pierce, the southern most fort in Utah, was constructed during
the fall of 1866.

Fort Pierce was named for Colonel J. D. L. Pierce, a

frontier missionary, soldier and rancher.

The fort was located at the head of

\V'arner Valley, which is situated about halfway between St. George and Kanab,
j1st north of the Arizona state line.

The Fort Pierce region was a major

cattle grazing area in and around Short Creed (Colorado City, Arizona).

The

f>rt was built on the edge of Fort Pierce Wash, overlooking a large cattle
corral built in the wash . It was possible for militia inside the fort to defend
tle corral from its protection.
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The fort was deemed necessary for the

prot ection of the livestock in the area.
The last fort to be constructed during the war was at Pipe Springs.
1hat area was one of the better grazing regions of Northern Arizona and was
U3ed as a staging area for the militia throughout the conflict.

53

The fort was

Longdorf , p. 110 .
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Lorenzo H. Re id , Dixie of the Deseret (Salt Lake City, Utah: Wheel\\.right Lithographing Co., 1964) , p. 164.
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Pipe Springs
Figure 1.

Forts used in the Black Hawk War. (Marked with*)
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built of native red sandstone and originally planned for 152 x 66 feet . The
completed fort measured 60 x 40 feet.
Located within its walls was a spring, so water was insured in case of
attack.

The fort was completed in 1872 with the exception of the doors .
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Windsor Castle, as the fort became known, still stands, today it is a historical
monument supervised by the National Park Service.

The fort was never used

for protection from Indians.

Peace Attempts

On accepting the treaty of June 1865 the Ute Indians agreed to move to
the Uintah Basin within one year.
Valley and Sanpete County.

They were to give up title to lands in Utah

The Indians also agreed that they would live in

peace and not steal from, or molest other whites . They promised that they
would not go to war with other tribes except in self defense.

The Indians

were to co-operate with the Indian Department in developing farms , building
homes and educating their children.
The United States Indian Department promised to give them protection
from whites and other Indians.

The Government was to Jay out farms, build

lumber and grist mills, schools, and houses.

Annuities were to be paid to the

principal chiefs and to the tribes in the amount of $25, 000 annually for the first
ten years, $20, 000 for the next twenty years and $15,000 for the next thirty
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Robert W. Olson Jr., "Windsor Castle, Mormon Frontier Fort at
Pipe Springs," utah Historical Quarterly, XXXIV, No. 3 (Summer, 1966),
225.
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years . The Indians were given permission to hunt , dig roots , and gather
be rries in all unoccupied areas.
places and to build drying houses.

They were a llowed to fish in the ir usua l
56

This treaty was never ratified by the

Senate and, therefore , never became effec tive.
Until March of 1866, Colone l Irish attempted to establish peace.

In

that month he was replace d as Superinte ndent of Indian Affairs by Colonel
Franklin H . Head.

Colone l Irish resigned because of business and family

pressures and returned East.
Governor Durkes.
in the territory.

Colonel Head had been the Secretary to

The new India n Agent began immediate ly to sec ure peace
In a letter dated March 31 , 1866, to Indian Commissioner

D. N. Cooley in Washington , Head said, "It is absolutely necessary to
provide food and clothing for the Indi ans near Nephi." He also stated the
need for seed grain.

He said tha t the Indians had been promised cattle a nd

that they would have trouble moving the Indi a ns to the reservation without the
stock.
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He attempted to get Federal he lp from the War Departme nt . While

waiting for information from General Dodge, Colonel Head a nd Governor
Durkes paid a visit to the Indian farm at Corn Creek , Millar County on June
21.

At Corn Creek, Colonel Head obtained new assurances from Chief Kanosh

that the Piute Indians would abide the treaty agreements.
While waiting for a reply from the commissioner, Head asked for
Indians who would seek out Black Hawk and get him to agree to meet with him,

56
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Deseret News , June 14 , 1865.
Indian Affairs Reports, March 31, 1866.
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to discuss a settlement.

Head expressed the thought that unless he could

pacify Black Hawk and the other Indians they would all unite in the warfare.
Colonel Head also paid a visit to the Uintah Basin to visit Indians that had
moved there according to the treaty of 1865.
Some attempts were made by Colonel Head to carry out the provisions
of the treaty.

A sawmill was started in the Strawberry Valley in September

of 1966. A group of men were sent from Springville to erect the mill and begin
operations.

The plan was to sell the lumber in Springville . Because of the

lack of operating funds and unskilled personnel the sawmill never became
operational.
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Colonel Head conferred with Chief Black Hawk in the Uintah Basin in
the first part of August of 1867.

Black Hawk at this time, assured Colonel

Head that he was ready for a peace treaty.

Black Hawk was still suffering

from his wound and was not able to take an active part in the war.
requested that Colonel Head cut his hair as a token of his sincerity.

He
Colonel

Head clipped Black Hawk's braids, and supposedly Black Hawk's participation
in the war was over.
Black Hawk informed Colonel Head that some of the sub-chiefs were
reluctant to stop the war, but that he would use his influence.

It was a full

year, however, before Colonel Head was to get a treaty from the sub-chiefs.
In March of 1868, a meeting was held in Mt. Pleasant.

Bishops of

all towns in Sanpete County and Bishop Bryan of Nephi met with Chief Joe, and
58
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other Indian warriors.

Chief Joe , a leading sub-chief of the Sanpete area

had been one of the leading War Chiefs of the Piutes.

Chief Joe spoke and

expr essed his desire for peace.

Other talks in the same vein were given

a nd finally a treaty was signed.

The Indians promised to stop molesting the

white settlers. As a token of good faith the Bishops had 1 , 000 pounds of flour
sent to the Indian camp.

This tre a ty was broken on April 4th when settlers

attempting to return to their homes in Richfield were attacked.

59

On August 19 , 1868, Superintendent Head met in the Strawberry Lake
a r ea with Black Hawk and several sub-chiefs.
Sowahpoint, Tameritz, and Shinavegin.
vicious of all Ute leaders.
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Prominent a t this time were

Tamari tz has been called the most

With the a iling Black Hawk's influe nce, Superin-

te nde nt Head was able to conclude a peace treaty with the sub-chiefs agree ing
to a cessation of hostilities . This treaty came a bout one year before peace
actu a lly came.

59
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Longdorf, p. 122.
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CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS OF THE SETTLERS

The Economy

The economy of the settlements of Utah in 1865 was strictly agrarian.
The most important farm crops were grains and grass hay .

Lives tock con-

sis ting of horses , cattle, and sheep we r e the mainstays , furnishing , food ,
clothing, a nd power.

Homes of the settlers were mostly log or adobe, a nd

many of the settlers still lived in poor cabins or dugouts.

1

Sawmills , how-

ever , had been established in the mountains eas t of Manti to furnish lumber
fo r homes and other buildings.
New settlers coming into the terr itory were actively seeking new
la nds for farming and grazing purposes.

Few of the settlers were considered

wealthy but some had small he rds of cattle or sheep.

With tr ansportation and

co mmunic a tion dependent upon the hors e, the settlers were mostly selfsufficient.
The war, while stimulating explor ation of unknown areas delayed the
settlement of these areas for years . Times remained hard throughout the
war with the farmer often required to leave his crops in the field while he

1

Letter of Mary Larson Ahlstrom , cited in the Family History,
Manti Public Library, Manti , Utah , p. 5 .

53

served with the militia.

A militia unit moving through Circleville after the

town had been abandoned pastured their horses in a grain field and remarked
that the crops looked fine.

Most of these crops were never harves ted . The

loss of livestock, homes and crops severely hampered the economy of the
frontier settlements.

The effects were felt long after Indian problems had

ceased.
As Indian hostilities renewed in 1866 Brigham Young advised the
people of the small settlements and scattered ranches to abandon them and
move into communities of not less than 150 families.
war 28 communities had been abandoned.
had worked years to build.

Before the end of the

The people left most of what they

Taking what livestock remained after the Indian

raids the settlers moved into the settlements of Beaver, Manti, Ephraim and
Mt. Pleasant.
This left all of Utah bare of settlements between Manti on the north
and St. George on the south

The settlers taking just what they could load into

wagons left homes and other buildings s tanding.

Buildings not burned by

Indians were used when the settlements were re-occupied.
in the fields, but some attempts were made to harvest them.

Crops were left
The evacuation

of Piute County left 700 acres of crops at Circleville plus those at Marysvale.
In the fall a group of men from Beaver returned to Circleville and were able
to harvest part of the grain.
Evacuating the scattered settlements proved to be a problem.
of the communities did not have e nough teams left to pull their wagons.

Many
Teams
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had to be sent from the large r settlements .

Militia units had to be dispatched

to guard the wagon trains.
The only wagon train to have serious trouble with the Indians was the
one evacuating Long Valley (Orderville).
attacked by Indians.

While ascending a hill the train was

One man was wounded in the attack as the settlers fled

into the trees leaving the Indians with the wagons and livestock.
later men returned to gather what remained.

Several days

Later some of the li vestock

was returned by Pi ede Indians who had gotten them from the Navaho.

2

Some of the evacuated towns were not reoccupied for years after the
end of hostilities.

Circleville was not reoccupied for eight years and only one

family of the original settlers returned.

3

Settlement Disruption

The war for sparcely settled Utah was costly.

The year 1865 e nded

with the loss of over 2, 000 head of cattl e and horses from the ce ntral part of
the territory.

Between thirty and forty settlers had lost their lives as had a n

estimated forty Indians . The Indi ans also burned ranches and sawmills over
a wide area of Central Utah.

These problems were further aggravated by

hundreds of acres of crops that could not be harvested .
Through defensive measures the loss of life among the settle rs was
reduced in 1866.

2

3

Between twenty and twenty-five settlers and an estimated

Woodbury, p. 163 .
Allen, p. 5.
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forty to fifty Indians were killed.

The loss of livestock for Central Utah

equaled the 1865 losses of 2, 000.
With the successful actions of the militia in 1866 the livestock loss
for 1867 fell to below 1, 000 animals in Central Utah and was almost eliminated
in succeeding years.

The number killed in 1867 was between twenty and

twenty-five, most were militia or travelers.
In a letter to Colonel J. E. Toutelette, Superintendent of Indian
Affairs in 1869, the people of Washington County claimed that they had been
bothered for five years by Navaho who had killed some eight or ten citizens.
They recounted losses of 500 horses and mules, 500 cattle, and 2, 500 head of
sheep.

4

There are no sheep losses shown for the rest of the territory.

The

Navaho Indians in stealing sheep showed a different culture than the Ute . There
are accounts of the Ute Indians riding into a flock of sheep and killing them for
sport but there are no records of attempts to steal them.
Besides the loss of livestock, the settlers were responsible for
financing the war.

As was shown above, the settlements assessed each settler

an amount to help finance the militia.

Larger communities took these losses

and were responsible for the care of the refugees from abandoned areas . The
development of the territory was delayed several years by the war and the
serious losses the settlers sustained .

4

Reid, p. 165 .
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The Cost

The dollars and cents cost of the war are significant. Costs figured
for the war in Central Utah were broken down into
and settlement abandonment.

militia, livestock losses ,

Costs for militia services were set at

$45,000 for 1865, $695,000 for 1866 and $450,000 for 1867 .

Livestock losses

were estimated at $75, 000 for 1865, $60,000 for 1866 and $35,000 for 1867.
Estimated loss by breaking up and vacating settlements in Sanpete, Sevier,
Kane, Summit, Wasatch and other counties was placed at $175, 000.
expenses for the three years came to $1 , 535,000.
available for the activities in Southern Utah .

Total

Cost figures are not

5

In January of 1869 , General Clawson, the Adjutant-General of the
Territory, submitted a claim of $1,121,037.38 to the Adjutant-Generals'
office in Washington, D. C.

6

The amount claimed covered the war for the

three years, and if costs for 1868 and Southern Utah had been added the amount
would have been over two million dollars .
The Government, in spite of repeated requests from Utah Officials,
refused to appropriate the money . With one exception there seems to be no
valid reason why claims were never paid.

Acting Governor Edwin Higgins,

in transmitting the claim to the Government, wrote, "I am unable to find from

5
Andrew Love Neff , History of Utah 1847-1869, edited and annotated
by Leland Hargrave Creer (Salt Lake City, Utah Deseret News Press, 1940),
p . 408 .
6

Ibid.
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Settlements evacuated during the Black Hawk War, 1865-71.
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Figure 4 .

Major depreda tion a r eas in U ta h , 196 5-71.
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the re cords of the executive office that the militia was ever authorized by the
Gove rnor of the Territory or of the ir being employed in the Indi an War. "

7

In 1869 the utah State Legislature appropriated $11,407 to r eimburse those
who s tood the brunt of the expense of relief expeditions.
of this amo unt went to Sanpete and Sevier Counties.

T en thous and dollars

8

In later years pensions were secured for the Veterans of the Black
Hawk War.

Because of inadequate records many men could not prove they

partic ipated in the war and were not e li gible whe n pensions were granted.
With the exception of the appropriation from the State Legislature the
entire cost of the war was borne by the people of the a r ea.

Most of the militia

served without pay.

Summary

When one seeks to evaluate the res ults of the Utah Black Hawk War,
many factors must be considered.
On the positive side of the war one finds several benefits or results
that te nded to aid early Utah.

Perhaps the most important and least recog-

ni zed is the fact that the people of Southern and Central Utah were once again
dr awn together to meet a common challenge.

Since the settling of the territory

in 1847 only the Johnston's Army threat a nd the Walker War had provided an
external stimulus to hold the pe ople together.

7
8

Gustive 0. Larson , p. 158.

Ibid.

One cannot ignore the Mormon
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Church's influence in Utah, however, the threat of danger tended to unite the
people in a more determined body.
The second benefit may well have been the hurried completion of the
Telegraph to the Central and Southern part of the State.

The telegraph, in

spite of threats, were rushed through Indian country without attack on construction workers or damage to constructed lines.
A third benefit may have been the exploration and discovery of favorable
valleys for future settlement.

Military units penetrated into the eastern half of

the state from as far south as Kane and Garfield counties, to as far north and
east as Uintah County. After the war, the retracted Mormon frontier in Southern
Utah and the Arizona strip was soon reoccupied, and quickly extended into
other areas.

One community to result from military exploration was Escalante

in 1887.
On the negative side one finds the usual results.

Although the seventy

lives lost seems small when compared to those in other Indian wars, the figure,
nevertheless, proved large for the sparsely populated area.

The fact that

these people were killed one or two at a time, and often in cruel or barbarious
fashion, is indicative of the horror that accompanied this war.
settlements had to group together for every small chore.

People of the

No one dared be

alone very far from help.
A second item may well be the cost.

The Utah Territorial Congress

peti tinned the United States Government unsuccessfully to defray the cost of
compensation of services, supplies and transportation.

The cost of this war

61
seems insignificant in the light of later war costs.

The citizens who bore the

brunt of this war were from small outly ing communities.

Many of these

communities were abandoned for the duration causing expenses to the people
involved not counted in military campaigns.
The disruption of normal growth and life for several years severly
hampered the economic development of the region.

This caused many of the

settlements to remain on unsteady footing for many years after the war.

Many

new settlements were evacuated for the juration of the war, some were never
resettled.

Some communities had to be rebuilt before they could be reoccupied.

Circleville was rebuilt as were several communities located in Sevier and
Washington Counties.

The need for every man to defend his home and family

le t few find the time to explore or seek new home sites.
The thousands of livestock lost to the Indians represented a major
portion of the losses suffered . In a day where the horse was man's means of
tr anspo rtation and furnished the power for his agriculture the loss of a hors e
could not be estimated.

Without the necessary horses the residents were

unable to work their farms or to gather the cattle and sheep that had to be
pastured in the mountains for feed.
The lack of rapid communication severely hampered the war effort.
The telegraph was extended to Manti in 1866, but by then the attacks were
occurring far from Manti.

The fact that the small communities of Sanpete,

Washington, Sevier, Millard and Piute Counties did not have a telegraph
decreased the value of it. Without r apid communication the settlements were
alone.

The Indians struck and were gone before help could be summoned.

By
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the time help arrived, the Indians were hours and miles away.

There is

nothing to indicate that other systems of communications were tried . It
see ms probable that signals of some type could have been used.

Mirrors,

smoke, or other signals had been used by the U.S. Military successfully by
1865.

The Manti Telegraph was used to get help from the north so it must

be classified as successful.
The war was largely fought by an amateur army.
poor at bes t .

Its equipment was

Most of the office rs were elected and inexperi e nced .

Letter excerpts s how some of the frustrations and fee lings expre ss ed
by t wo lead ing figures in the war.
''Report to General D. H. Wells
"Manti, Sept. 8th, 1868
"There has nothing particularly tra nspired since the unfortunate
occurrence at Warm Creek on the night of the 4th of which we telegraphed you on the fifth. I very much reject the necess ity of saying
that this affair, as has been the case in almost every other disaster,
was no more, no less than the result of carelessness
. It seems
impos s ible for some of us to learn or re me mbe r anything except
throu sic sad experience.
9
'Gen . W. B. Pace"
"Letter to General D. H. We lls
"March 1, 1867
"Just over from Gle nwood , Alma, and Richfield where I have
been laboring for the past few days. I think with much profit.
"In the military capacity the pe ople there are like sheep without
a shepherd. It is s aid tha t Colonel Smith has command of the forces
in that county but he is a nonre sident , and for all advice and efficient
a id to that people he might almost as well reside in St. Louis , Live r pool or London. As to live on the opposite side of the mountains with

9
box 6.

Military Records , T err itori a l Militia--Nauvoo Legion correspondence,
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whom they can have no communication by reason of snow and
lack of roads . The people want him right with them in their
midst, family, bag, and baggage .
"They think they could fight better and are sure he could
if residing with his family tn their midst. If fighting should be
necessary. And, I am of the same opinion and knowing no
source more proper to apply to than yourself for a word direct
to him to repair with his family forthwith to any one of the three
settlements on the Sevier . The people there are anxious not
knowing how soon they may be attacked by Indians.
"I may be mistaken in my impressions launching the design
or 'Brother Smith' having charge of thst district, if so , I ask
pardon, if not, I wish him urged over as soon as possible, each
one of the three settlements has a copy of the President's last
letter to me which I think will serve as a general order, and
instructions to Colonel Smith with any additional instructions or
orders that you may think proper to give him .
"I remain Very Respectfully
"Orson Hyde
10
"Sc ipio , Round Valley"
With conditions like these existing two or three years after the war
had started, one cannot but wonder how or why the Indians decided to stop
raiding.
Neither side in this war won a clear victory.

The Indians only placed

their relations with the settlers on a more difficult footing.

The whites were

able to move the Ute Indians onto the reservation but at an extremely high
cost.

The cost of the war, if counted in sacrifice, inconvenience and loss of

life proved high.

10
Ibid .
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